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Abstract 
Governments are increasingly using randomized controlled trials (RCTs) to evaluate 
policy interventions. RCTs are often understood to provide the highest quality evidence 
regarding the causal efficacy of an intervention. While randomization plays an essential 
epistemic role in the context of policy RCTs however, it also plays an important distributive role. 
By randomly assigning participants to either the intervention or control arm of an RCT, people 
are subject to different policies and so, often, to different types and levels of benefits. In this 
paper, I identify one necessary condition as well as a set of sufficient conditions for the 
permissible use of random assignment by government agencies. I argue first that random 
assignment is permissible only if it is consistent with governments’ duty to realize morally 
important outcomes. I argue second that random assignment is permissible in cases where 
investigators are in a state of genuine equipoise regarding all arms of the experiment and the 
policy to which people have a claim of justice. Finally, I defend a set of conditions under which 
random assignment is permissible in cases where one or more arms of a policy RCT are 
reasonably expected to be either superior or inferior to this policy. 
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Governments  are increasingly using randomized controlled trials (RCTs) to evaluate 
policy interventions.1 RCTs are often understood to provide the highest quality evidence 
regarding the causal efficacy of an intervention.2 By randomly assigning participants to 
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1 For good overviews of the increasing use of RCTs, see Steven D. Levitt and John A. List, “Field Experiments in 
Economics: The Past, the Present, and the Future,” European Economics Review 53 (2009): 1-18; Judith M. Gueron 
and Howard Rolston, Fighting for Reliable Evidence (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2013); Delia Baldassarri 
and Maria Abascal, “Field Experiments Across the Social Sciences,” Annual Review of Sociology 43 (2017): 41-73; 
Andrew Leigh, Randomistas: How Radical Researchers are Changing Our World (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 2018); and Luciana de Souza Leão and Gil Eyal, “The Rise of Randomized Controlled Trials (RCTs) in 
International Development in Historical Perspective,” Theory and Society 48 (2019): 383-418.  
2 William R. Shadish, Thomas D. Cook, and Donald T. Campbell, Experimental and Quasi-Experimental Designs 
for Generalized Causal Inference (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 2002), 226-278. For a critical evaluation of RCTs, see 
Angus Deaton and Nancy Cartwright, “Understanding and Misunderstanding Randomized Controlled Trials,” Social 
Science & Medicine 210 (2018): 2-21. 
 3 
intervention and control groups, for example, investigators can minimize selection bias – i.e. 
systematic differences between those subject and not subject to the intervention that are 
potentially correlated with the outcome of interest. With observational studies, investigators can 
never be certain whether outcomes are the result of the intervention, or of some distinctive 
characteristic(s) for which they have not controlled.  
 Randomization thus plays an essential epistemic role in the context of policy 
experiments. However, it also plays an important distributive role as participants are randomly 
assigned to different policies and so, often, to different types and levels of benefits. This is 
troubling when some are randomly assigned to a promising intervention, while others are 
assigned to the seemingly inferior status quo policy or receive nothing. For example, some may 
receive cash transfers while others do not;3 some may receive housing vouchers while others do 
not;4 some students may be assigned to smaller class sizes while others remain in larger classes;5 
and some children may receive a deworming treatment while others do not.6 
 
3 For example, see T. Paul Schultz, “School Subsidies for the Poor: Evaluating the Mexican Progresa Poverty 
Program,” Journal of Development Economics, 74 (2004): 199-250; and Sudhanshu Handa et al., “The Social and 
Productive Impacts of Zambia’s Child Grant,” Journal of Policy Analysis and Management 35 (2016): 357-387. 
4 Raj Chetty, Nathaniel Hendren, and Lawrence F. Katz, “The Effects of Exposure to Better Neighborhoods on 
Children: New Evidence from the Moving to Opportunity Experiment,” American Economic Review 106 (2016): 
855-902. 
5 Word, E., Johnston, J., Bain, H., Fulton, B.D., Zaharias, J.B., Achilles, C.M., Lintz, M.N., Folger, J., and Breda, C. 
(1990). The State of Tennessee’s student/teacher achievement ratio (STAR) Project. Tennessee: Tennessee Board of 
Education. 
6 Edward Miguel and Michael Kremer, “Worms: Identifying Impacts on Education and Health in the Presence of 
Treatment Externalities,” Econometrica 72 (2004): 159-217. 
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It would be convenient if random assignment were not only epistemically ideal but also 
ideal from the standpoint of distributive justice. However, commentators rightly question 
whether it is always fair to allocate access to a promising intervention by lottery.7 Since research 
designs must be ethical in their treatment of participants as well as scientifically robust, it is 
imperative to determine when – if ever – it is fair to employ random assignment. There are moral 
constraints on the means we may use to produce knowledge, even when this knowledge promises 
to greatly facilitate governments’ ability to promote people’s wellbeing or secure a more just 
social order. 
In this paper, I identify one necessary condition as well as a set of sufficient conditions 
for the permissible use of random assignment in policy RCTs. While not necessarily exhaustive, 
 
7 See Edward Diener and Rick Crandall, Ethics in Social and Behavioral Research (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1978), 135-140; Rebecca Kukla, “Resituating the Principle of Equipoise: Justice and Access to Care in Non-
ideal Conditions,” Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 17 (2007): 171-202; Stéphane J. Baele, “The Ethics of New 
Development Economics: Is the Experimental Approach to Development Economics Morally Wrong?” The Journal 
of Philosophical Economics VII (2013): 2-42; Dawn Langan Teele, “Reflections on the Ethics of Field 
Experiments,” in Field Experiments and Their Critics: Essays on the Uses and Abuses of Experimentation in the 
Social Sciences, Edited by Dawn Langan Teele (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2014): 115-140; Rachel 
Glennerster and Shawn Powers, “Balancing Risk and Benefit: Ethical Tradeoffs in Running Randomized 
Evaluations,” in The Oxford Handbook of Professional Economic Ethics, Edited by George DeMartino and Deirdre 
McCloskey (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016): 367-401; Stephen T. Ziliak and Edward R. Teather-
Posadas, “The Unprincipled Randomization Principle in Economics and Medicine,” in The Oxford Handbook of 
Professional Economic Ethics, Edited by George DeMartino and Deirdre McCloskey (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2016): 423-448; Douglas MacKay, “The Ethics of Public Policy RCTs: The Principle of Policy Equipoise,” 
Bioethics 32 (2018): 59-67; and Margarita S. Rayzberg, “Fairness in the Field: The Ethics of Resource Allocation in 
Randomized Controlled Experiments,” Science, Technology, & Human Values, 44 (2019): 371-398. 
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these conditions provide guidance for the principal scenarios in which government agencies 
consider and employ RCTs. Part 1 provides a brief account of the nature of government policy 
RCTs and the obligations that are directly relevant to random assignment. I argue that random 
assignment is permissible only if it is consistent with governments’ duty to realize morally 
important outcomes. Parts 2 and 3 identify a set of sufficient conditions for permissible 
randomization. Part 2 re-interprets the familiar norm of clinical equipoise for policy RCTs, 
arguing that random assignment is permissible when the social science community occupies a 
state of uncertainty regarding the interventions under study. Part 3 considers whether it is ever 
permissible to use random assignment when equipoise is not satisfied – i.e. when there is strong 
evidence that one intervention is superior to the alternatives. I argue that it is and defend a set of 
conditions under which doing so is permissible. One interesting conclusion of my analysis is thus 
that equipoise is not a necessary condition of ethical randomization as is sometimes proposed.8 
Part 4 refines the necessary condition introduced in part 1 and gives some examples of RCTs that 
violate it. 
My analysis is limited in two ways. First, I focus on experiments that are conducted or 
authorized by governments rather than non-governmental organizations. Governments have 
distinct duties to their citizens that are directly relevant to the conduct of research and so the 
ethics of randomization in government policy experiments is deserving of separate treatment.9 
 
8 Indeed, I defend this position in “The Ethics of Public Policy RCTs.” 
9 For discussion of the importance of this distinction in the context of clinical research ethics, see Douglas MacKay, 
“Standard of Care, Institutional Obligations, and Distributive Justice,” Bioethics 29 (2015): 262-273; and Leah 
Pierson and Joseph Millum, “Health Research Priority Setting: The Duties of Individual Funders,” American 
Journal of Bioethics 18 (2018): 6-17. For an overview of governments’ involvement in policy RCTs, see de Souza 
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Second, I focus on the permissibility of random assignment. Policy RCTs must no doubt meet a 
number of additional requirements to be permissible – e.g. informed consent, social value, and 
fair participant selection – but a full specification of these requirements is beyond the scope of 
this paper.10 
 
1 Government Policy Experiments and the Requirements of Justice 
 Governments are increasingly making use of experiments rather than observational 
research to evaluate public policies. Unlike observational research, policy experiments involve 
the introduction of a policy intervention, or the alteration of an existing policy intervention, as 
part of a systematic investigation aimed at generating knowledge about the intervention’s impact. 
They may also involve the collection of data that would not otherwise be collected. Policy RCTs 
are policy experiments that employ random assignment.11 
Government policy experiments are policy experiments that are conducted or authorized 
by a government agency. For example, a government agency may introduce and evaluate a 
 
Leão and Eyal, “The Rise of Randomized Controlled Trials (RCTs) in International Development in Historical 
Perspective.” 
10 For a discussion of when informed consent is necessary for government policy experiments, see Douglas MacKay 
and Averi Chakrabarti, “Government Policy Experiments and Informed Consent,” Public Health Ethics 12 (2019): 
188-201. 
11 My definition of a policy RCT is very similar to David Greenberg and Mark Shroder’s definition of a social 
experiment. According to them, a social experiment involves: (1) random assignment, (2) a policy intervention, (3) 
follow-up data collection, and (4) evaluation of the intervention’s effectiveness. See David Greenberg and Mark 
Shroder, The Digest of Social Experiments, Third Edition (Washington, DC: The Urban Institute Press, 2004), 4. 
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particular intervention itself or grant permission to a non-governmental organization or private 
firm to do so. Governments also authorize policy experiments when they fund them.  
 One might wonder why government agencies’ use of RCTs raises any ethical questions at 
all. With clinical RCTs, ethical questions concerning randomization are sometimes thought to 
arise because investigators are physicians and so have a fiduciary obligation to promote 
participants’ health-related interests.12 Social scientists, by contrast, have no such obligations and 
legitimate governments possess the authority to make policy decisions. However, governments 
possess duties of justice and these obligations are directly relevant to the conduct of policy 
research, placing constraints on the types of policies to which they may randomly assign people. 
Consider that on prominent liberal theories of justice, governments have duties to protect 
residents’ liberty, promote their health, combat poverty, and ensure access to high-quality 
educational opportunities.13 I shall the use the concept of target outcomes to refer to 
specifications of the type and amount of goods or services governments have a duty to provide, 
and the outcomes they have a duty to realize. Target outcomes may include specific levels of 
health insurance coverage, specific degrees of personal security and liberty, certain literacy 
outcomes, or a minimal standard of living. Target outcomes may vary from state to state, 
 
12 For example, see Samuel Hellman and Deborah S. Hellman, “Of Mice but Not Men – Problems of the 
Randomized Clinical Trial,” The New England Journal of Medicine 324 (1991): 1585-1589. 
13 For a range of different theories that advocate duties of this kind, see John Rawls, A Theory of Justice, Revised 
Edition (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999); Ronald Dworkin, Sovereign Virtue: The Theory and Practice 
of Equality (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 2000); Norman Daniels, Just Health: Meeting Needs Fairly 
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008); and John Tomasi, Free Market Fairness (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2012). 
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depending on cultural variation and resources, and governments may have different duties 
towards citizens and non-citizens.  
 To realize any particular target outcome, governments must implement laws and policies 
that satisfy a number of criteria. First, they must implement policies that are evidence-based. K-
12 students, for example, have a claim of justice to education policies that can be reasonably 
expected to realize literacy and numeracy outcomes. Governments must also, second, implement 
policies that are consistent with people’s rights. For example, they must not implement policies 
that, while effective in realizing a particular target outcome, unjustly restrict people’s liberty. 
Third, governments must implement policies that are consistent with the realization of other 
target outcomes. They must not put so many resources into achieving educational outcomes that 
they are unable to adequately promote people’s health.  
For any particular target outcome therefore, governments should implement policies that 
are: (1) evidence-based; (2) consistent with people’s rights; and (3) consistent with the 
realization of other target outcomes. Governments should therefore implement policies that are 
best proven (to satisfy 1), but also, to borrow a concept from Alex John London, morally and 
practically attainable and sustainable (to satisfy 2 and 3).14 A policy is morally and practically 
attainable and sustainable, I suggest, if and only if: 
1. It is consistent with people’s rights; and 
 
14 Alex John London, “Equipoise and International Human-Subjects Research,” Bioethics 15 (2001), 327.  
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2. It can be implemented for an appropriate period of time given a just system of 
resource procurement and allocation.15 
The policy that satisfies these conditions is thus the most effective, rights-respecting policy a 
government could implement to realize a particular target outcome if it acted justly and 
effectively in the procurement and allocation of resources. Call this the best proven morally and 
practically attainable and sustainable policy, or, BPA (best proven attainable) policy for short.16  
 BPA policies should not be understood as Platonic ideals that apply to all societies. 
Societies differ reasonably in terms of their norms, political cultures, political institutions, and 
established policy regimes, among other factors. Societies also differ in terms of bureaucratic 
expertise, fiscal capacities, and social capital. A set of policies that are effective at realizing 
certain health outcomes in one country should not therefore be assumed to be BPA policies for 
another. Such policies may not work in the same way in the latter country, and the latter country 
may lack the fiscal and administrative capacities necessary to properly implement them. BPA 
policies are thus likely to be highly context specific, and in many cases may simply be the status 
quo policies. For the status quo policy not to be the BPA policy, after all, there must be some 
policy that is known to be more effective for the particular context in question, and that can be 
 
15 MacKay, “The Ethics of Public Policy RCTs,” 62. I use the phrase “appropriate period of time” rather than “long-
term” to recognize that there may be cases when it is reasonable to implement a policy for only a short period of 
time rather than, as is often the case, for the foreseeable future. 
16 Ibid. As will become clear below, this concept of the BPA policy plays an analogous role in discussions of the 
ethics of policy RCTs as the concept of “standard of care” plays in discussions of the ethics of clinical RCTs. For a 
helpful overview of this latter concept, see Alex John London, “The Ambiguity and the Exigency: Clarifying 
‘Standard of Care’ Arguments in International Research,” Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 25 (2000): 379-397. 
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implemented sustainably given the government’s expected fiscal and bureaucratic capacities – a 
high standard to meet. 
 Governments’ obligations to realize target outcomes and enact BPA policies are relevant 
for the conduct and design of policy RCTs. First, governments may have duties of justice to 
conduct policy research. Even in reasonably just societies, there is likely to be a gap between the 
outcomes governments have a duty to realize (and which are in principle realizable), and the 
outcomes realized by existing policies. For example, it is arguable that governments have a duty 
to secure fair equality of opportunity for their citizens, that is, to ensure that people’s life 
prospects are not unduly influenced by their parent’s socio-economic status.17 By comparison 
with other countries, Canada does a reasonably good job of satisfying this principle.18 However, 
there is still a sizeable gap between the outcomes Canada’s existing policies realize, and the 
outcomes demanded by fair equality of opportunity. The federal and provincial governments of 
Canada should close this gap to the extent that it is feasible to do so, and one strategy is to 
conduct research to identify policies that would be more effective in improving the mobility rates 
of low-income children.  
As a concrete example of such research in the U.S., the Seattle and King County Housing 
authorities have recently partnered with researchers to conduct an RCT to identify the reasons 
why low-income families do not move to low-poverty neighborhoods which offer expanded 
 
17 Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 73. 
18 OECD, A Broken Social Elevator? How to Promote Social Mobility (OECD Publishing, Paris, 2018) Available at: 
https://doi.org/10.1787/9789264301085-en.  
 11 
opportunities for upward income mobility.19 Housing voucher recipients in Seattle and King 
County were randomized to either receive or not receive a suite of services designed to reduce 
barriers to moving to high-upward-mobility neighborhoods, including help in the search for 
homes and short-term financial assistance. Researchers found that while only 14% of families in 
the control group moved to a high-upward-mobility neighborhood, 54% of families in the 
intervention group did so, a finding useful for the design of affordable housing policies for low-
income residents.20 It is arguable that the Seattle and King County Housing Authorities have an 
obligation to conduct this type of RCT as a way to improve the economic opportunity of low-
income Americans. 
Second, and more pertinently, governments’ duty to realize target outcomes places 
constraints on the use of random assignment: random assignment is permissible only if it is 
consistent with this duty. This condition would not be terribly constraining if it were permissible 
for governments to realize target outcomes to different degrees for different people. However, 
for many target outcomes, governments will likely have a duty to realize them to the same extent 
for all residents. For example, governments arguably have obligations to ensure that all residents 
have access to the same minimal level of health care, enjoy the same minimal level of personal 
security, and have access to adequate nutrition. Even in cases where there are target outcomes 
that are specific to a subset of the population, any policy RCT is likely to focus on members of 
that subset. For example, governments may have special obligations to children to realize 
 
19 Peter Bergman, Raj Chetty, Stefanie DeLuca, Nathaniel Hendren, Lawrence Katz, and Christopher Palmer, 
“Creating Moves to Opportunity: Experimental Evidence on Barriers to Neighborhood Choice,” NBER Working 
Paper No. 26164 (August 2019): 1-46.   
20 Ibid, 2.  
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educational outcomes, but any RCT evaluating educational interventions is only going to enroll 
children, not adults.  
Government agencies may only randomly assign participants to different interventions 
therefore if doing so is consistent with their duty to realize target outcomes for participants and 
non-participants. Call this necessary condition of permissible random assignment NC. 
NC: Government agencies may authorize or conduct policy experiments in which 
participants are randomly assigned to different interventions only if such assignment is 
consistent with their duty to realize target outcomes for participants and non-participants.  
Since, for most policy RCTs, agencies will have a duty to realize the same target outcomes for 
participants and non-participants, and since RCTs involve assigning people to different 
interventions which may be expected to realize such outcomes to different extents, NC would 
seem to place strict constraints on the permissible use of random assignment. Indeed, one might 
wonder whether random assignment is ever permissible.  
In the next section of the paper, I begin to outline a set of sufficient conditions for 
permissible randomization. Doing so will also make it possible to refine NC and outline 
examples of RCTs that violate it, a task I return to in part 4. 
 
2 Permissible Randomization 1: Policy Equipoise 
 To determine when random assignment is permissible, it is helpful to consider when it is 
permissible for governments to use lotteries to distribute goods. Peter Stone has made important 
headway on the morally appropriate role of lotteries in decision-making and the allocation of 
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scarce goods.21 Stone focuses on fair lotteries – i.e. lotteries for which equal probabilities can be 
assigned to outcomes – since they are more unpredictable than weighted lotteries and 
unpredictability is the central contribution of lotteries to decision-making.22 My analysis also 
focuses on fair lotteries as the method of random assignment in policy RCTs, though I briefly 
discuss the use of weighted lotteries in the conclusion.  
Stone argues that the purpose of fair lotteries is to sanitize the decision-making process 
from the influence of reasons. The distinguishing feature of lotteries as a decision-making 
process, Stone claims, is that the outcomes of the process are unpredictable.23 When agents make 
use of reasons to make decisions, by contrast, the outcome of the process is predictable – it is the 
outcome that is responsive to the reasons in question. This role of lotteries in decision-making is 
valuable, Stone argues, in cases of indeterminacy, that is, cases where the process of reasoning 
does not pick out one option as preferable.24 Where decision-makers are in a state of 
indeterminacy, fair lotteries are a permissible way to make decisions; where there is a possibility 
of appealing to bad reasons, fair lotteries are obligatory.25  
Stone’s account of the role of lotteries is useful for identifying when random assignment 
is permissible. Since it is permissible to use fair lotteries in cases of indeterminacy, it should be 
permissible for government agencies to employ random assignment when they are in a state of 
 
21 See Peter Stone, The Luck of the Draw: The Role of Lotteries in Decision Making (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2011).  
22 Ibid, 24. 
23 Ibid, 35-36. 
24 Ibid, 30-31. 
25 Ibid, 39-40. 
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indeterminacy. One such state is when government agencies lack sufficiently strong reasons to 
prefer that participants be subject to either the intervention or control arm. Another is when they 
have sufficiently strong reasons to prefer the intervention arm but are in a state of indeterminacy 
regarding who should have access to it. I explore the former condition in this section before 
turning to the latter in the next. 
 From the standpoint of their duty to realize target outcomes, government agencies lack 
sufficiently strong reasons to prefer either the intervention arm or the control arm of an RCT 
when there is reasonable disagreement within the social science community regarding which arm 
is superior for the realization of these outcomes. The simplest example of this type of case is 
where there is one target outcome and there is reasonable disagreement within the social science 
community regarding which arm is more effective at realizing it. There may also be more 
complex cases, however, where the interventions under study are expected to realize multiple 
target outcomes, A and B, each intervention is expected to realize A and B to different degrees, 
but there is reasonable disagreement regarding which balance of A and B is preferable from the 
standpoint of justice. 
Where government agencies are in this state of indeterminacy between the interventions 
under study, they are in a state of equipoise. The norm of clinical equipoise is a principal norm 
governing the design of clinical RCTs.26 For some scholars, it promises to reconcile physician-
researchers’ fiduciary obligation to promote the medically-related interests of patient-subjects, 
 
26 See Benjamin Freedman, “Equipoise and the Ethics of Clinical Research,” The New England Journal of Medicine 
317 (1987): 141-145. 
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with the need to randomly assign them to an intervention.27 Policy equipoise functions in a 
similar way, offering government agencies a way to reconcile random assignment with their duty 
to realize target outcomes for people.28 In cases of reasonable disagreement regarding the relative 
efficacy of the interventions under study, government agencies lack sufficiently strong reasons to 
conclude that one intervention will better realize the outcomes in question than the other. This 
need not mean that the reasons in support of the interventions in question are equally balanced, 
but rather that the social science community is collectively uncertain regarding which 
intervention is superior.29 Some experts have good reasons to think that intervention C is 
superior to D while others have good reasons to think that D is superior to C.  
The mere fact that government agencies are in a state of equipoise regarding the 
interventions under study does not entail that participants are treated justly. People have claims 
of justice to be subject to BPA policies, and so government agencies treat participants justly 
when there is reasonable disagreement regarding all arms of the study and the BPA policy. The 
following is therefore a sufficient condition of permissible random assignment: 
Sufficient Condition (SC) 1: Government agencies may randomly assign participants to 
different policy interventions if they are in a state of genuine equipoise regarding all arms 
of the study and the BPA policy. 
 
27 P.B. Miller and C. Weijer, “Trust Based Obligations of the State and Physician-Researchers to Patient-Subjects,” 
Journal of Medical Ethics 32 (2006): 542-547. 
28 MacKay, The Ethics of Public Policy RCTs,” 63. 
29 For further discussion on this point, see Alex John London, “Equipoise: Integrating Social Value and Equal 
Respect in Research with Humans,” in The Oxford Handbook of Research Ethics, edited by Douglas MacKay and 
Ana Iltis (New York: Oxford University Press, forthcoming). 
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Where this principle is satisfied, no participant is subject to a policy for which there are 
sufficiently strong reasons to judge that it will realize the relevant target outcomes to a greater or 
lesser degree than the BPA policy.  
Further work is necessary to identify when RCTs satisfy this condition and when they do 
not. In particular, it is necessary to provide an account of the “epistemic threshold” that an 
intervention must meet if it is to be judged superior to alternative interventions with respect to 
the realization of target outcomes.30 Such an account would provide policymakers with a 
systematic way to evaluate and weigh the different types of evidence that are relevant to the 
interventions in question, and specify a threshold such evidence must meet for equipoise to be 
disturbed, and thus for government agencies to have sufficiently strong reasons to favor one 
intervention over another. 
To my knowledge, there has been no systematic study regarding how often something 
like SC1 is satisfied by policy RCTs, or even whether equipoise is considered a binding norm. 
Indeed, the concept of “equipoise” is rarely mentioned in the rather scant literature on the ethics 
of policy RCTs, despite its importance to the ethics of clinical RCTs.31 There is evidence 
however that some people are uncomfortable with RCTs that satisfy SC1. A recent study found 
that people judge a randomized experiment comparing two interventions – A and B – in a state 
 
30 See Ibid. 
31 For exceptions, see Kukla, “Resituating the Principle of Equipoise;” Baele, “The Ethics of New Development 
Economics;” Ziliak and Teather-Posadas, “The Unprincipled Randomization Principle in Economics and Medicine;” 
and MacKay, The Ethics of Public Policy RCTs.” 
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of equipoise as less appropriate than the universal imposition of either A or B.32 While the study 
authors suggest this preference is unreasonable, one might argue that it reflects a commitment to 
the principle of equal treatment. For RCTs that satisfy SC1 may lead to one group being subject 
to an intervention that is ex post inferior or superior, whereas universal imposition avoids this 
possibility. Universal imposition may also better express the value of equality than an RCT.33  
We should reject this interpretation of equal treatment, however, since it has counter-
intuitive implications. Suppose a proposed RCT evaluating A and B satisfies SC1 and, to 
simplify, that the mean expected target outcomes for individuals, based on existing evidence, is 6 
for both policies. Suppose that in actual fact A yields an outcome of 8 whereas B yields an 
outcome of 6. According to the above interpretation of equal treatment, this RCT is objectionable 
because some participants would be subject to an ex post inferior policy – B – while others 
would be subject to an ex post superior one – A. Instead, either universal imposition of A or 
universal imposition of B is preferable to an RCT since both options avoid this inequality. But, if 
universal imposition of B is superior to the RCT, then we are committed to preferring an option 
where no participants are better off and some are worse off (those who would have been subject 
to A in the RCT).34 Consider too that we need not abandon the principle of equal treatment to 
prefer the RCT to universal imposition of either A or B. Since the RCT satisfies SC1, all 
 
32 See Michelle N. Meyer, Patrick R. Heck, Geoffrey S. Holtzman, Stephen M. Anderson, William Cai, Duncan J. 
Watts, and Christopher F. Chabris, “Objecting to Experiments that Compare Two Unobjectionable Policies or 
Treatments,” PNAS 116 (2020): 10723-10728. 
33 Thanks to an anonymous Associate Editor for raising these objections. 
34 Derek Parfit, “Equality and Priority,” Ratio X (1997), 211. 
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participants are treated equally in the sense of being subject to policies which are ex ante 
equivalent (roughly) with respect to the realization of target outcomes. 
Indeed, even proponents of the former interpretation of equal treatment are unlikely to 
favor universal imposition over RCTs that satisfy SC1. Such egalitarians often address the 
counter-intuitive implications of this interpretation by noting that while equal states of affairs are 
preferable to unequal states of affairs in one respect, the latter may nonetheless be on balance 
preferable when they offer a better balance of equality and other values – e.g. utility.35 This 
matters since a policy of permitting RCTs promises much greater utility than a policy of 
universal imposition since the latter would greatly hinder policymakers’ ability to learn about the 
effectiveness of different policies. In the above example, if RCTs are prohibited, policymakers 
might implement the inferior policy B and never come to know that A is superior. An RCT, by 
contrast, permits the possibility of unequal outcomes for the duration of the study, but then 
provides policymakers with evidence regarding which policy should be implemented long-term 
for all. 
There are also cases where it is permissible for government agencies to conduct RCTs in 
which the experimental intervention is expected to be inferior to the BPA policy, but is in a state 
of equipoise with the status quo policy. Consider a situation in which a government agency 
wishes to conduct a policy RCT, but where citizens are not subject to the BPA policy: 
Healthy Incentives Pilot: In 2011, the U.S. Department of Agriculture’s (USDA) Food 
and Nutrition Service designed the Healthy Incentives Pilot (HIP) with the aim of 
determining whether Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) recipients, 
 
35 Larry Temkin, “Equality, Priority, and the Levelling Down Objection,” in The Ideal of Equality, edited by M. 
Clayton and A. Williams (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2000): 81-125. 
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would increase their consumption of fruits and vegetables in response to financial 
incentives.36 Participants assigned to the HIP received an incentive of $0.30 on their 
electronic benefit transfer (EBT) card for each dollar of SNAP benefits they spent on 
fruits and vegetables from participating retailers. In 2011, 7,500 SNAP recipients in 
Hampden County Massachusetts were randomly selected to participate in the experiment. 
These participants received specially marked EBT cards as well as multiple notifications 
regarding their enrollment.37 Data were collected from a variety of sources, including 
through voluntary surveys with samples of both HIP and non-HIP households, from EBT 
transaction data, and from surveys and observations of participating food retailers.38 
Assume that the current SNAP policy is not the BPA policy since its benefits are too low to 
realize the relevant target outcome – secure access to food adequate to meet nutritional needs – 
and a more generous policy is affordable in the U.S.39 Given this assumption, the HIP pilot 
compared two policies that were expected to be inferior to the BPA policy, the status quo SNAP 
policy and the experimental healthy incentives policy. Assume further that the USDA Food and 
Nutrition Service occupied a state of genuine equipoise regarding the status quo SNAP policy 
 
36 Bartlett, S., Klerman, J., Olsho, L., Logan, C., Blocklin, M., Beauregard, M., Enver, A., Wilde, P., and Owens, C., 
(2014). Evaluation of the Healthy Incentives Pilot (HIP): Final Report. Available at: https://fns-
prod.azureedge.net/sites/default/files/ops/HIP-Final.pdf. 
37 Ibid, 25. 
38 Ibid, 26-38. 
39 Kranti Mulik and Lindsey Haynes-Maslow, “The Affordability of MyPlate: An Analysis of SNAP Benefits and 
the Actual Cost of Eating According to the Dietary Guidelines,” Journal of Nutrition Education and Behavior 49 
(2017): 623-631. 
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and the experimental healthy incentives policy.40 Was random assignment between these two 
interventions permissible? 
 The U.S. government was not in a state of indeterminacy regarding the current SNAP 
policy, the healthy incentives policy, and the BPA policy. It ought therefore to have implemented 
the BPA policy. But the USDA’s Food and Nutrition Service did not have the authority to do so 
since Congress is responsible for setting SNAP benefit levels. Although the USDA has the 
authority to design and conduct experiments on proposed changes to SNAP, it does not have the 
option of implementing the BPA policy. Participants in the HIP, like all SNAP recipients, were 
thus treated unjustly by the U.S. government since they were not subject to the BPA policy. But 
the USDA Food and Nutrition Service did not commit an additional wrong against participants 
by randomly assigning them to either the current SNAP policy or the healthy incentives 
intervention. Since it occupied a genuine state of equipoise, participants were not subject to a 
policy reasonably expected to be less effective at realizing the target outcome in question than 
those outside of the experiment. Participants were either subject to the status quo policy or the 
experimental healthy incentives intervention, which was not expected to be inferior.41 
 This analysis suggests there is an additional condition under which random assignment is 
permissible: 
 
40 Though it is intuitive to think that the health incentives policy would be more effective, government agencies face 
significant challenges in successfully communicating program changes to recipients. In the context of the HIP, only 
62 percent of households receiving the incentive intervention reported having heard of it 4-6 months after they 
began participating in the study. Bartlett et al. Evaluation of the Healthy Incentives Pilot (HIP), 85. 
41 MacKay, “The Ethics of Public Policy RCTs,” 64-65. 
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SC2: A government agency may randomly assign participants to different policy 
interventions if: 
1. It occupies a state of genuine equipoise regarding all arms of the study and the 
non-BPA status quo policy; and 
2. It does not have the authority to implement the BPA policy. 
Random assignment is therefore permissible even if government agencies are not in a state of 
equipoise regarding the interventions under study and the BPA policy. However, neither SC1 nor 
SC2 permits agencies to authorize or conduct such a policy RCT where they have the authority 
to simply implement the BPA policy. If they have this authority, they should exercise it, not 
conduct or authorize RCTs which evaluate inferior policies.  
 Suppose governments agencies are not in a state of indeterminacy between the 
interventions in an RCT, might random assignment still be permissible? I explore this question 
next. 
  
3 Permissible Randomization 2: Just Allocation of a Scarce Good 
Government agencies may have reasons to conduct RCTs even when they are not in a 
state of equipoise. I argue that random assignment is permissible in such cases when agencies are 
in a state of indeterminacy regarding who should have access to the superior intervention. I first 
discuss RCTs that evaluate the BPA policy against a superior non-BPA policy. I then turn to 
RCTs that evaluate the BPA policy against an inferior non-BPA policy.  
 
3.1 Random Assignment to the BPA Policy and a Superior Non-BPA Policy  
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Government agencies may have reasons to evaluate the BPA policy against a policy that 
is reasonably expected to be superior in realizing target outcomes, but that is not morally and 
practically attainable and sustainable. An RCT may help policymakers more precisely determine 
how much better the policy is and along which dimensions and may also enable them to more 
accurately estimate the implementation costs. Such evidence may be useful for estimating the 
cost-effectiveness of the policy and may inform decisions about whether to work to implement it 
in the future. An RCT may also yield a deeper understanding of the intervention’s underlying 
mechanisms – i.e. how it causes superior outcomes.  
 Consider the Canadian province of Ontario’s recent guaranteed income pilot project: 
Guaranteed Income: Beginning in 2018, the government of Ontario randomly assigned 
over 6000 low-income participants in three locations to either an experimental guaranteed 
income intervention or the status quo policy.42 The experimental policy offered recipients 
a maximal cash transfer of $16,989/year for individuals and $24,027/year for couples, 
less 50% of any earned income.43 The status quo policy offered recipients a maximum 
cash transfer of $8,472 for individuals and $13,140 for couples if their income fell below 
a certain threshold; and to receive this transfer individuals had to be willing to actively 
look for employment. Policymakers sought to understand the experimental intervention’s 
impact on participants’ ability to meet basic needs, food security, stress and anxiety, 
 




mental health, health and healthcare usage, housing stability, education and training, and 
employment and labor market participation.44 
The guaranteed income intervention, while undoubtedly superior to the status quo policy with 
respect to the target outcomes of income security, food security, and housing stability (among 
others), was not the BPA policy since its affordability was in doubt. A central purpose of the 
RCT was thus to determine whether the intervention would lower people’s labor market 
participation, and lower demand for healthcare services. Assuming that the status quo policy was 
the BPA policy, participants were either subject to the BPA policy or a superior non-BPA policy, 
and so were subject, at minimum, to a policy expected to realize the relevant target outcomes to 
the extent promised by the BPA policy. Since the guaranteed income intervention is superior to 
the BPA policy, the central ethical question concerns the allocation of a scarce good: access to 
the experimental policy. 
 Following Stone’s work on lotteries, random assignment is permissible in these types of 
cases when policymakers are in a state of indeterminacy regarding who should receive access to 
the superior non-BPA policy. A state of indeterminacy obtains, Stone argues, if there is a group 
of people with equally strong claims to the good, and not enough of it to satisfy all the claims.45 
The use of a fair lottery, Stone argues, realizes the value of impartiality, which demands that 
agents only allocate scarce goods on the basis of claim strength, not on the basis of irrelevant 
factors. Where parties have equally strong claims to a scarce good, agents must allocate it on the 
basis of no reasons at all, and since fair lotteries sanitize the decision-making process from the 
 
44 Ibid. 
45 Ibid, 52-53. 
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influence of reasons, they offer an impartial way to allocate it.46 For this type of policy RCT 
therefore, random assignment is permissible if participants have equally strong claims to access 
the non-BPA policy.  
 One might argue that such RCTs will rarely be permissible since people’s claims to 
scarce goods often vary in strength. For example, it is arguable that the worse off have stronger 
claims to scarce goods than the better off. However, where the scarce good is access to a non-
BPA policy, this is less likely to be true since people do not have claims of justice to superior 
non-BPA policies. Superior non-BPA policies differ from BPA policies in that they are not 
morally and practically attainable and sustainable. As such, governments have no duty to 
implement them. Access to the non-BPA policy is a discretionary good, a good the government 
has no obligation to offer to citizens, and so to which no citizen has a claim right.47  
 The fact that access to the non-BPA policy is a discretionary good does not imply that the 
government may allocate it in any way it pleases. Michael Blake puts the point nicely: 
[A] state which gave new cars to all and only white men would be guilty of racial 
discrimination even if it had no duty to give cars to anyone. Those who did not receive 
such cars would quite rightly complain that no valid principle could ground such a 
discriminatory form of distribution. Their complaint would not be mollified by the 
response that the state, in giving cars, was providing a benefit it had no obligation to 
provide to anyone.48 
 
46 Ibid, 82-83. See also John Broome, “Fairness,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 91 (1990-1991), 97-98. 
47 Michael Blake, “Immigration and Political Equality,” San Diego Law Review 45 (2008), 966. 
48 Ibid, 970. 
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Even when allocating discretionary goods, governments still have a duty to treat their citizens as 
moral equals and so may not allocate the good on the basis of reasons that violate people’s moral 
equality. However, because the good in question is discretionary, governments have more 
leeway in how they distribute it.  
 For example, suppose the U.S. government creates a program that offers ordinary people 
the opportunity to travel to space alongside professional astronauts.49 It would be reasonable to 
hold a lottery among willing and able candidates. The U.S. government has no obligation to 
allocate the opportunity in a way that creates the most utility or gives priority to the worse off. 
By contrast, if it is making a decision about how to allocate scarce vaccines in a pandemic, 
holding a lottery is unlikely to be a just approach.50 Where the scarce good is non-discretionary, 
people often have claims of varying strength and so allocation via lottery will be impermissible; 
in cases where the scarce good is discretionary, this is less likely to be so. 
 One might object that the use of random assignment in Guaranteed Income did not treat 
people as moral equals. First, only those who met the eligibility requirements concerning income 
and geographic location could participate. Second, the study involved the unequal treatment of 
low-income participants since some were granted access to the non-BPA policy and some were 
not. Indeed, this line of argument was found persuasive in the case of Finland’s basic income 
experiment. Investigators initially proposed randomly assigning people to different benefit 
 
49 This is not a terribly fanciful example. In 1984, President Ronald Reagan introduced the Teacher in Space Project, 
which granted teachers the opportunity to travel to space as Payload Specialists. 
50 See Govind Persad, Alan Wertheimer, and Ezekiel J. Emanuel, “Principles for Allocation of Scarce Medical 
Interventions,” The Lancet 373 (2009): 423-431. 
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levels, including levels far greater than that of the status quo policy.51 However, this proposal 
was rejected on the grounds that it would violate the Finnish constitution, which requires that all 
individuals are to be treated equally.52 Investigators were thus required to test only one basic 
income intervention at a level that was roughly equivalent to the existing policy.53 
 I agree that governments have a duty to treat their citizens equally where this involves not 
treating them differently on the basis of some morally arbitrary ground. However, this duty does 
not always forbid governments from using random assignment in cases where the BPA policy is 
evaluated against a superior non-BPA policy. 
 I suggest that whether a ground of differential treatment is morally arbitrary depends on 
two factors: whether the ground is irrelevant to the treating agent’s realization of one or more of 
its purposes; and whether the treating agent’s purpose is more valuable than the purposes that 
would be frustrated by the differential treatment.54 The moral arbitrariness of grounds of 
differential treatment is thus context dependent. Skill may be morally arbitrary when a 
government agency is deciding how to allocate scarce vaccines in an epidemic; it may not be 
when that agency is deciding whom to hire. 
Although governments have a duty not to treat people differently on the basis of morally 
arbitrary grounds, differential treatment is thus consistent with this duty if: 
 
51 Kela, From Idea to Experiment: Report on Universal Basic Income Experiment in Finland. 2016. Available from: 
https://helda.helsinki.fi/bitstream/handle/10138/167728/WorkingPapers106.pdf, 12-13. 
52 Ibid, 60. 
53 Ibid. 
54 Douglas MacKay, “Immigrant Selection, Health Requirements, and Disability Discrimination,” Journal of Ethics 
and Social Philosophy 14 (2018), 56. 
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A. The differential treatment is expected to significantly advance the realization of one of 
the government’s purposes; 
B. There is no non-differential treatment by which the government may significantly 
advance the realization of its purpose that would not result in undue burdens on it; and 
C. The purpose of the government is more valuable than the purposes frustrated by the 
differential treatment.55 
Conditions (A) to (C) together express the idea that governments may treat people differently on 
the basis of grounds that are not morally arbitrary. Conditions (A) and (B) specify that the 
ground of differential treatment must indeed be relevant – i.e. non-arbitrary – to the 
government’s realization of one of its purposes. Condition (C) specifies that the ground of 
differential treatment is morally non-arbitrary by ensuring that the purpose in question is more 
valuable than the purposes that would be frustrated by the differential treatment.56  
The underlying idea of this account is that differential treatment is morally worrisome 
when and because it involves disadvantaging people in the pursuit of their purposes.57 Hence 
there is a strong justification for laws and policies that prevent public and private agents from 
treating people differently – i.e. anti-discrimination laws. However, it also recognizes that 
prohibitions on differential treatment may prevent public and private agents from pursuing 
morally important purposes. Conditions (A) to (C) provide a framework for adjudicating 
conflicts between the purposes of different agents, suggesting that differential treatment is 
 
55 Ibid, 57. 
56 Ibid, 55-56. 
57 Ibid, 50. 
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permissible when it is necessary for the realization of some purpose, and this purpose is more 
valuable than the purposes that would be frustrated by it.58  
Might RCTs such as Guaranteed Income satisfy (A) to (C)? To answer this question, an 
account of how to weigh and compare the value of different purposes is needed. Developing such 
an account is beyond the scope of this paper; but the following sketch offers what I take to be a 
promising approach that is sufficient to motivate the claim that random assignment is sometimes 
permissible in cases like Guaranteed Income. 
Consider first that within theories of justice, those purposes that are morally most 
important are the subject of certain deontic categories.59 Agents have duties of justice to fulfill 
purposes whose realization is morally imperative, and people have claims of justice that these 
purposes be fulfilled. Similarly, agents are granted rights to protect their ability to pursue 
purposes that are particularly valuable. One important distinction among purposes therefore is 
that those that are the subject of duties or claims of justice are more valuable than those that are 
not. For liberal theories of justice broadly construed, states have duties of justice to ensure 
residents have access to those goods they require to set, revise, and pursue a conception of the 
good life; and residents have claims of justice to these goods, including basic rights and liberties, 
education, health care, opportunities, and income. Residents do not however have claims to those 
goods necessary to realize particular conceptions of the good life. I have a claim of justice on the 
state to provide me with healthcare, not to satisfy my preference to travel widely. 
 
58 Ibid, 57-58. For further discussion on the need to limit the scope of anti-discrimination law to secure the ability of 
agents to pursue valuable purposes, see Sophia Moreau, “What is Discrimination?” Philosophy & Public Affairs 38 
(2010), 160-169. 
59 MacKay, “Immigrant Selection, Health Requirements, and Disability Discrimination,” 55-61.  
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A second consideration concerns the closeness of the relationship between an agent’s 
purposes and its morally permitted central goals and values. By agents’ own lights, purposes that 
are closer to such goals and values are more valuable than those that are incidental to them. For 
collective agents – e.g. government agencies, private for-profit corporations, and private civic 
associations – the value of a particular purpose depends on its closeness to the defining objective 
of those agents.60 Where institutions or organizations are established to realize some morally 
permissible objective, for example, to practice a particular religious faith in the case of houses of 
worship, or to provide certain goods or services in the case of for-profit corporations, purposes 
that are closely tied to this objective should be given greater weight.61 The same is true of 
individuals: particular purposes are more valuable the closer they are tied to their conception of 
the good life and the values they hold dear.  
With these considerations in hand, we can show how my account justifies cases of prima 
facie permissible differential treatment. First, it explains why it is sometimes permissible for 
American colleges receiving public dollars to favor racial minorities for admission in order to 
secure the educational benefits of having a diverse student body. Such a policy satisfies (A) since 
providing a rich educational environment for college students is a core purpose of colleges; and 
it satisfies (B) when alternative admissions schemes fail to realize this purpose. It also satisfies 
 
60 Ibid, 56. 
61 This is reflected in discrimination law where, as Tarunabh Khaitan notes, for an organization’s discriminatory 
treatment to be justifiable it must be necessary to advance some goal that is closely tied to its “raison d’être.” 
Tarunabh Khaitan, A Theory of Discrimination Law (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015), 181. Similarly, 
Sophia Moreau notes that most jurisdictions permit agents to justify a discriminatory rule by showing that it is a 
“Bona Fide Requirement” and so necessary for the “fulfillment of the organization’s goals.” Moreau, “What is 
Discrimination?” 164. 
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(C) since, whereas this purpose is central to the mandate of colleges and is arguably one they 
have a duty to carry out, no applicant has a claim of justice to attend any particular college.62 
Similarly, my account explains why it is permissible for religious organizations, including 
houses of worship and schools, to favor applicants for clerical or educational roles on the basis of 
religious faith. Such discriminatory treatment satisfies (A) and (B) since such organizations can 
only successfully practice and promote a particular faith if people performing these roles are 
committed to that faith. It also satisfies (C) since the practice and promotion of a particular faith 
is the defining purpose of religious organizations whereas people have no claim to perform a 
particular job for a particular employer.63 
Policy RCTs like Guaranteed Income will sometimes satisfy conditions (A) to (C). 
Recall that the differential treatment in Guaranteed Income involved excluding ineligible people 
from participation and assigning some participants to the superior non-BPA policy. Both forms 
of differential treatment satisfy condition (A) since they facilitate the carrying out of an 
 
62 MacKay, “Immigrant Selection, Health Requirements, and Disability Discrimination,” 60. The U.S. Supreme 
Court reasons in much the same way, recently re-affirming the judgment that colleges may employ diversity 
affirmative action policies when they are necessary to fulfill their compelling interest in securing the educational 
benefits of a diverse student body and the use of race is narrowly tailored to realizing that interest. See Fisher v. 
University of Texas at Austin et al., 136 S.Ct 2198 (2016). 
63 MacKay, “Immigrant Selection, Health Requirements, and Disability Discrimination,” 58. My account therefore 
provides justification for Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 which prohibits employers from discriminating on 
the basis of religion but exempts any “religious corporation, association, educational institution, or society with 
respect to the employment of individuals of a particular religion to perform work connected with the carrying on by 
such corporation, association, educational institution, or society of its activities.” Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 
U.S.C. § 2000(e). 
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affordable RCT aimed at producing socially valuable knowledge: the effect of a guaranteed 
income on the behaviors of low-income people. These forms of differential treatment are also 
likely to satisfy (B) since random assignment may be necessary to produce high-quality evidence 
and other study designs are also likely to involve differential treatment – i.e. rolling out the 
program in one location rather than another. In addition, geographical limitation is arguably 
necessary to minimize logistical and financial costs. 
Regarding (C), Ontario was aiming to produce knowledge that is relevant to raising the 
living standards of low-income residents. This purpose is very valuable since Ontario arguably 
has a duty of justice to realize it. The purposes frustrated by the differential treatment, namely, 
the interests of non-participants in having a chance to access the guaranteed income intervention, 
and the interests of participants in the control arm in having access to it, are much less valuable. 
Because this intervention was not the BPA policy, Ontarians had no claim of justice to it, and so 
the purposes in question are not as valuable for that reason.  
Although I have shown that Guaranteed Income satisfies (A) to (C), my account of 
permissible differential treatment must be developed further if it is to be helpful in the weighing 
of competing purposes more generally. For example, the considerations discussed above do not 
address cases where differential treatment is necessary to realize some purpose required by 
justice but also frustrates some purpose an individual has a claim of justice to carry out. 
Nonetheless, I expect many policy RCTs comparing a BPA policy against a superior non-BPA 
policy will satisfy the conditions I have identified. The differential treatment such RCTs involve 
is often necessary to generate high-quality evidence regarding the superior non-BPA policy, and 
provided the expected knowledge is valuable, the value of this purpose will usually outweigh the 
interests of those wanting access to the non-BPA policy since they have no claim of justice to it. 
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Finally, one might object that my account of permissible differential treatment is too 
limited, falling into the family of liberty-based theories of discrimination according to which 
discrimination is objectionable insofar it disadvantages people in the exercise of their freedom on 
the basis of morally arbitrary features of their identity.64 But some suggest that discriminatory 
actions and policies are wrong because of the message they express. For example, Deborah 
Hellman argues that discrimination is wrong when and because it demeans people, where 
demeaning action involves “an expression of the unequal humanity of the other.”65 One might 
argue therefore that even if an RCT satisfies the above three conditions of permissible 
differential treatment, it is still wrong since it demeans those who are ineligible to participate as 
well as those assigned to the control arm.66 
It’s difficult to see how such an RCT would do so though. For Hellman, whether an act is 
demeaning is not dependent on whether its target feels demeaned, but rather on whether the act is 
demeaning, where ascertaining this involves complex interpretive judgments regarding social 
practices.67 In Guaranteed Income, for example, the decision to limit prospective participants to 
low-income residents of particular geographic areas was justified by reference to the need to 
generate knowledge about the intervention’s impact on a particular population, and by the need 
to limit financial and logistical costs. In no way does the study rest on the judgment that low-
income people residing outside the study areas are less worthy of income support. In addition, 
the use of a fair lottery to decide assignments to the intervention and control arms does not 
 
64 See also Moreau, “What is Discrimination?” and Khaitan, A Theory of Discrimination Law. 
65 Deborah Hellman, When is Discrimination Wrong? (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2008), 35-38. 
66 Thanks to an anonymous Associate Editor for raising this objection. 
67 Ibid, 75-79. 
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express the judgment that the humanity of those assigned to the control arm is unequal in some 
way. Fair lotteries do not treat people differently based on their membership in socially salient 
groups; and they implicitly recognize the equal standing of those subject to them by granting 
them an equal chance to receive the good in question.  
This analysis implies a third sufficient condition for the permissible use of random 
assignment: 
SC3: Government agencies may randomly assign participants to different policy 
interventions if:  
1. No participant is subject to an intervention reasonably expected to be inferior to 
the BPA policy;  
2. Participants have equally strong claims to be subject to any superior non-BPA 
policy under evaluation; and 
3. Differential treatment of eligible and ineligible people, and participants and non-
participants, is practically necessary to produce knowledge relevant for the 
realization of target outcomes. 
Condition (3) summarizes conditions (A) to (C) of the above account of permissible differential 
treatment. Differential treatment is practically necessary to produce knowledge relevant for the 
realization of target outcomes when government agencies cannot otherwise do so without 
incurring undue burdens. 
 
4.2 Random Assignment to the BPA Policy and an Inferior Non-BPA Policy  
Government agencies may also have reasons to evaluate the BPA policy against an 
inferior policy. First, policymakers may begin to implement a new BPA policy but introduce an 
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element of random assignment in the policy’s roll-out to facilitate the collection of high-quality 
evidence regarding its effectiveness. Such policy RCTs violate the requirement of equipoise 
since there are sufficiently strong reasons to think that the new intervention – the BPA policy – is 
superior to the non-BPA status quo policy. However, it is often not possible to roll out the new 
BPA policy to all eligible people at the same time due to insufficient resources or logistical 
difficulties. A second type of case arises when the BPA policy has been rolled out but does not 
cover all eligible people due to resource constraints. In this type of case, access to the BPA 
policy may already be determined by lottery, thus making random assignment prima facie 
permissible. 
 In these types of cases, the BPA policy is a “scarce policy,” that is, a policy for which 
there are insufficient resources – e.g. money, bureaucratic capacity, etc. – to cover all eligible 
citizens. A scarce BPA policy is thus one that is attainable and sustainable, but only for some 
portion of eligible people, at least for some period of time. A scarce BPA policy is different from 
an experimental policy since the former is one that governments have decided to implement. 
RCTs evaluating scarce BPA policies are thus often opportunistic since the policy in question 
has been or will be implemented outside of the context of an RCT.  
Government agencies may have a number of reasons for carrying out RCTs evaluating 
scarce BPA policies. First, even when there is evidence supporting a particular intervention, an 
RCT may yield higher-quality evidence regarding its effectiveness, or evidence regarding some 
particular feature of it. Second, governments may have political reasons to conduct an RCT in 
the context of policy roll-outs. The collection of high-quality evidence regarding the policy’s 
effectiveness may make it more difficult for a subsequent government to eliminate it.  
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 Is it permissible to use random assignment to evaluate scarce BPA policies? I first 
consider the case of policy roll-outs, working through the example of Mexico’s roll-out of 
Progresa, a conditional cash transfer program. I then turn to the case of BPA policies for which 
there are insufficient resources to cover all eligible people. 
Progresa: Beginning in 1998, the Mexican federal government began implementing 
Progresa in 495 poor rural communities, a program offering conditional cash grants to 
mothers below a specific poverty level with at least one child enrolled in grades 3 
through 9.68 The grants were conditional on the child attending 85% of school days with 
the size of the grant varying on the gender and grade level of the child, and inflation.69 
Partnering with investigators, the federal government first identified the poorest rural 
communities and then randomly selected 314 of these 495 localities to receive the 
program from summer 1998 to summer 2000, with the remaining 181 localities serving as 
controls until fall 2000 when they too would receive the program.70 Mothers receiving the 
cash grant were informed that the program subsidies were assured only for three years – 
the time until the next election.71  
 The challenge for RCTs like this one is that the government would seem to be denying 
people access to an intervention to which they are entitled. Note too that the promise to expand 
the program once the RCT was completed does not address this problem since there would still 
be a two-year period when the people in question would not have access to it. Similarly, if I am 
 
68 Schultz, “School Subsidies for the Poor,” 202. 
69 Ibid. 
70 Ibid. 
71 Ibid, 206. 
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entitled to government-provided health insurance, it is unjust to strip me of this benefit for the 
purposes of conducting an RCT, and the fact that the RCT is time-limited does not eliminate this 
injustice. 
 Commentators have argued, however, that it is sometimes permissible to conduct this 
type of RCT. They note first that if the BPA policy in question is genuinely a scarce policy, it is 
inevitable that not all citizens will access it. They argue second that random assignment is a fair 
way to allocate opportunities to be subject to the BPA policy.72 In these types of cases, these 
commentators conclude, random assignment is ideal not only from an epistemic perspective, but 
also from the perspective of distributive justice.  
 This line of argument is promising, but it needs further development. First, if such an 
RCT is to be permissible, the resource constraints must be such that there is a sufficient window 
of time to conduct a well-designed RCT. That is, there must be some number of people X 
without access to the intervention for time Y where X and Y are large enough to carry out a well-
designed RCT. If one or more people is denied access to an intervention to which they are 
entitled for some period of time longer than would be dictated by genuine resource constraints, 
an injustice has occurred.  
 
72 For examples of this line of argument, see Diener and Crandall, Ethics in Social and Behavioral Research, 136; 
Abhijit Banerjee and Esther Duflo, "The Experimental Approach to Development Economics," in Field Experiments 
and Their Critics: Essays on the Uses and Abuses of Experimentation in the Social Sciences, Edited by Dawn 
Langan Teele (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2014), 101; J.M. Gueron, “The Politics and Practice of Social 
Experiments: Seeds of a Revolution,” in Handbook of Economic Field Experiments, Volume 1, edited by Abhijit 
Banerjee and Esther Duflo, (Amsterdam: North-Holland, 2017), 35, 49; and Glennerster and Powers, ”Balancing 
Risk and Benefit,” 380-381. 
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Second, random assignment may not always be a fair way to allocate opportunities to 
access the BPA policy. For random assignment to be permissible in these types of cases, eligible 
people must have equally strong claims to it. In Progresa, if one community had a stronger claim 
to the conditional cash transfer program than another, then it was wrong to employ a lottery to 
determine which community received it. In contrast to Guaranteed Income, because the 
conditional cash transfer program was the BPA policy, low-income Mexicans had a claim to 
access it.   
Third, the randomization procedure must recognize the claims of all people eligible for 
the BPA policy. If people below some income threshold are eligible for a scarce cash transfer 
program and have equally strong claims to it, it will not be permissible to allocate this program 
by means of a fair lottery that only considers some claims and not others. That is, if government 
agencies wish to use random assignment to evaluate a BPA policy, they may not carve out a 
portion of the eligible population and conduct a fair lottery among them since doing so fails to 
recognize the equally strong claims of eligible people outside of this population. The 
randomization procedure must therefore be consistent with the conducting of a fair lottery among 
all eligible people. 
The above analysis suggests a fourth sufficient condition regarding the permissibility of 
random assignment:  
SC4: If the BPA policy is a scarce policy, government agencies may randomly assign 
participants to either the BPA policy or some alternative intervention or non-intervention 
(which may be inferior) if: 
1. No participant is subject to an intervention reasonably expected to be inferior to 
the non-BPA status quo policy;  
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2. Participants have equally strong claims to be subject to the BPA policy; and 
3. No person’s claim to the BPA policy is devalued for the purposes of conducting 
the RCT. 
Regarding (3), a person’s claim to the BPA policy is devalued either if they are given no chance 
to receive the BPA policy or if their chance to receive the BPA policy is lesser than is warranted 
by the strength of their claim. 
These conditions are also helpful for determining the permissibility of RCTs where the 
BPA policy is not temporarily scarce but permanently so. Consider the Moving to Opportunity 
RCT: 
Moving to Opportunity: In 1992, the U.S. Congress authorized the U.S. Department of 
Housing and Urban Development to carry out the Moving to Opportunity for Fair 
Housing (MTO) study. Eligible to participate in the study were low-income families with 
children living in public housing or Section 8 project-based housing located in census 
tracts with poverty rates of at least 40 percent.73 4,608 families, in five large U.S. cities, 
participated in the study. Participating families were randomly assigned to one of the 
following three groups: 
A. The MTO Low Poverty Voucher Group: Families assigned to this group 
received a Section 8 voucher usable only in low-poverty areas (10 percent of 
the population below the poverty line in 1990) as well as counseling and 
assistance in finding a private unit to rent; 
B. The Traditional Voucher Group: Families assigned to this group received 
regular Section 8 vouchers – i.e. vouchers with no geographic restriction – 
 
73 Chetty, Hendren, and Katz, “The Effects of Exposure to Better Neighborhoods on Children,” 860. 
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along with ordinary briefings and assistance from local public housing 
agencies (PHAs); 
C. The Control Group: Families assigned to this group received no vouchers but 
remained eligible for public or project-based housing and other social 
programs.74 
The MTO study had two research goals: comparing the costs of interventions (A) and 
(B); and determining the impact of intervention (A) on the well-being of families and 
their children, including “their housing conditions, mental and physical health, 
employment and earnings, receipt of social program assistance and income, education, 
and delinquent or risky behavior of children.”75 Families were willing to participate in the 
MTO study because demand for Section 8 housing assistance outstripped supply.  
 When Moving to Opportunity was carried out, the BPA policy was a scarce policy. HUD 
and local PHAs did not have sufficient funding to provide section 8 housing vouchers to all 
eligible residents. Given the number of families involved in Moving to Opportunity and the size 
of demand for these vouchers, it is arguable that condition (3) of SC4 is satisfied. Conducting 
Moving to Opportunity did not prevent HUD or local PHAs from implementing the BPA policy 
in an appropriate way – i.e. Moving to Opportunity did not lead to fewer people overall receiving 
Section 8 housing vouchers. Moving to Opportunity also satisfies condition (1); no arm of the 
RCT was expected to be less effective than the non-BPA status quo policy, in this case no 
intervention. 
 
74 “A Summary Overview of Moving to Opportunity: A Random Assignment Housing Mobility Study in Five U.S. 
Cities,” available at: https://www.nber.org/mtopublic/MTO%20Overview%20Summary.pdf. 
75 Ibid. 
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The real question is whether the study satisfies condition (2). Participating families were 
randomly assigned to one of the above three groups, but some families may have stronger claims 
than others to the traditional voucher – e.g. those which are worse off. Indeed, local PHAs 
currently have the authority to deviate from a first-come, first-served allocation system by giving 
priority to particular types of families, including families who are homeless or living in 
substandard housing, and families who are paying more than 50% of their income in rent.76 
 My aim here is not to determine whether the Moving to Opportunity was ethical or not. 
Doing so would require a good deal of research and defending a position on distributive justice. 
Rather, my aim is to show that where the BPA policy is a scarce policy, random assignment may 
sometimes be impermissible. To satisfy SC4, participants must have equally strong claims to be 
subject to the BPA policy. Importantly, this need not mean that all who are eligible for the policy 
must have equally strong claims, only that study participants do so. It may therefore be 
permissible to conduct a study similar to Moving to Opportunity if the eligibility criteria are 
designed so as to only include people who are similarly situated – i.e. members of the worse off 
group. Of course, such a study must also satisfy condition (3) and so not involve devaluing the 
claims of non-participants. The conditions I outline above for permissible random assignment 
thus also offer lessons for the ethical design of RCTs, not only their evaluation.  
 Government agencies may also wish to conduct RCTs such as Progresa or Moving to 
Opportunity under conditions where people are not subject to the BPA policy. For example, a 
government agency rolling out policy A, which it knows to be inferior to the BPA policy, may 
wish to randomly assign participants to receive either A or the non-BPA status quo policy for the 
 
76 U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, Housing Choice Vouchers Fact Sheet, available at: 
https://www.hud.gov/topics/housing_choice_voucher_program_section_8 
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purposes of collecting higher quality evidence regarding A’s effectiveness and mechanisms. 
Might such random assignment be permissible?  
 I think so. As with Healthy Incentives Pilot, as long as the government agency in 
question lacks the authority to implement the BPA policy and people are not made worse off 
than they would otherwise be, random assignment is permissible. To cover these types of cases, 
we can therefore add a fifth sufficient condition 5: 
SC5: If citizens are subject to an inferior non-BPA scarce policy, governments agencies 
may randomly assign participants to either the scarce non-BPA policy or some alternative 
intervention or non-intervention (which may be inferior) if: 
1. The government agency responsible for designing and conducting the RCT does 
not have the authority to reform the non-BPA status quo policy or otherwise 
subject participants to the BPA policy; 
2. No participant is subject to an intervention reasonably expected to be inferior to 
the policy to which eligible people would be otherwise subject if they are not 
subject to the non-BPA scarce policy;  
3. Participants have equally strong claims to be subject to the non-BPA scarce 
policy; and  
4. No person’s claim to the non-BPA scarce policy is devalued for the purposes of 
conducting the RCT. 
 
4 Refining the Necessary Condition 
 Part 1 concluded with a statement of the following necessary condition for the 
permissible use of random assignment: 
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NC: Government agencies may authorize or conduct policy experiments in which 
participants are randomly assigned to different interventions only if such assignment is 
consistent with their duty to realize target outcomes for participants and non-participants.  
Having worked through a number of scenarios in which government agencies conduct 
RCTs, we can now refine this condition and give some examples of RCTs that violate it. In 
particular this condition should be refined to more clearly account for cases where government 
agencies lack the authority to implement the BPA policy, and cases where the BPA policy is a 
scarce policy. I suggest the following formulation: 
NC*: Government agency A may randomly assign participants to different interventions 
only if no participant or nonparticipant’s claim to have their target outcomes realized to 
the extent promised by the policy A has a duty to implement is devalued. 
A person’s claim is devalued when the chance of this claim being fulfilled is less than what it 
ought to be given A’s duties of justice. 
 This formulation accounts for scenarios where government agencies wish to evaluate a 
promising intervention that is reasonably expected to be inferior to the BPA policy but lacks the 
authority to implement it. Government agencies only have a duty to implement the most 
effective policy they have the authority and resources to implement. It also accounts for 
scenarios where the BPA policy is scarce by allowing that the value of people’s claims may vary. 
Where the BPA policy is not scarce, people have a claim to access it or a policy that is not 
reasonably expected to be inferior. An RCT that granted them only a 50% chance of accessing 
such a policy would therefore devalue their claim. Where a BPA policy is scarce, people may 
only have a claim to have a chance of accessing it, where the strength of their claim may vary, 
for example, based on need. 
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 What are some types of RCTs that would violate NC*? First, it will be impermissible for 
government agencies to randomly assign participants to an intervention that is reasonably 
expected to be inferior to the BPA policy when they have the authority to implement it. This will 
be true even if participants are ex ante no worse off than they would otherwise be because the 
government agency in question has failed to implement the BPA policy. For example, a number 
of U.S. states have chosen not to expand their Medicaid programs under the framework of the 
Affordable Care Act. Under this legislation, states have the option to expand Medicaid coverage 
to low-income adults earning less than 138% of the federal poverty level, with the federal 
government committed to paying 100% of the costs of expansion through 2016, with the 
matching rate phasing down to 90% in 2020.77 Suppose the North Carolina legislature, which has 
decided not to expand Medicaid, authorizes the North Carolina Department of Health and 
Human Services to conduct an RCT in which uninsured North Carolinians are randomly 
assigned to either no coverage, or a bare-bones catastrophic health insurance plan, with the aim 
of determining whether the latter plan leads to superior health and financial outcomes for 
recipients. This study would violate NC* since North Carolina has the authority to expand 
Medicaid, there is good evidence to suggest that having Medicaid leads to better health and 
financial outcomes than not having Medicaid,78 and an expanded Medicaid program is clearly 
 
77 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 42 U.S.C. § 18001 (2010). Note that under the initial legislation, 
Medicaid expansion was required. In June 2012, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that Medicaid expansion is lawful 
only as an option for states. National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519 (2012). 
78 Larisa Antonisse, Rachel Garfield, Robin Rudowitz, and Madeline Guth, “The Effects of Medicaid Expansion 
under the ACA: Updated Findings from a Literature Review,” Kaiser Family Foundation (August 2019), available 
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attainable and sustainable in North Carolina given its resources and the funding commitments of 
the federal government.  
The same will be true for government agencies that lack the authority to implement the 
BPA policy, but randomly assign participants to an intervention that is ex ante inferior to the 
policy they have a duty to implement. For example, it would be impermissible for the USDA’s 
Food and Nutrition Services to randomly assign SNAP recipients to a version of SNAP that is ex 
ante inferior – but perhaps cheaper – than the current SNAP policy since doing so would devalue 
recipients’ claims to the current policy. 
It will also be impermissible to use random assignment where the BPA policy is scarce 
and an RCT devalues the claims of some participants or non-participants. Although the Section 8 
housing voucher program was a scarce policy in Moving to Opportunity, it would have been 
impermissible to randomly assign participants to the three interventions under study if some had 
a stronger claim than others to the traditional voucher. If households at risk of homelessness have 
stronger claims to a voucher than others, random assignment is not permissible for it devalues 
their claims, treating them as equal to those of others. Similarly, RCTs are also impermissible if 
they devalue the claims of nonparticipants. Had the Mexican government in Progresa withheld 
the conditional cash transfer from more households than necessary in order to conduct a well-
designed RCT in a particular region of the country, the Mexican government would have 






There are no doubt other ways in which policy RCTs may violate NC*. My hope is that 
this discussion is helpful in illustrating NC*’s implications for the permissible conduct of RCTs. 
 
Conclusion 
 My aim in this paper has been to specify conditions for the permissible use of random 
assignment by government agencies. I have defended one necessary condition in addition to five 
sufficient conditions. I do not claim that this list is exhaustive. For example, one possibility 
worth exploring is whether, in cases where it would be unfair to allocate access to a scarce BPA 
policy by means of a fair lottery, it would be permissible to do so by means of a weighted lottery. 
Some scholars argue that there are circumstances where weighted lotteries are a just way to 
allocate scarce goods,79 and the use of such lotteries has been explored in the context of clinical 
RCTs.80 
One might worry that if the conditions I have identified in this paper are exhaustive (or 
nearly exhaustive), my account will constrain the development of valuable knowledge. For 
example, as I note above, it is possible that Moving to Opportunity was unethical and so should 
 
79 See Frances Myran Kamm, “Equal Treatment and Equal Chances,” Philosophy and Public Affairs 14 (1985): 177-
194; and Ben Saunders, “A Defence of Weighted Lotteries in Life Saving Cases,” Ethical Theory and Moral 
Practice 12 (2009): 279-290. 
80 See Andrew L. Avins, “Can Unequal Be More Fair? Ethics, Subject Allocation, and Randomised Clinical Trials,” 
Journal of Merical Ethics 24 1998: 401-408; Spencer Phillips Hey and Jonathan Kimmelman, “The Questionable 
Use of Unequal Allocation in Confirmatory Trials,” Neurology 82 (2014): 77-79; and Alexander A. Iyer, Saskia 
Hendriks, and Annette Rid, “Advantages of Using Lotteries to Select Participants for High-Demand COVID-19 
Treatment Trials,” Ethics & Human Research, Forthcoming. 
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not have been carried out as designed. Such a conclusion would be regrettable in one respect 
since this study yielded highly valuable findings regarding the impact of neighborhoods on 
children’s life prospects. 
My first response to this concern is “tough.” One of the great moral advances of the 20th 
century was the recognition that participants in clinical research must be treated with respect and 
fairness, and that these constraints may not be set aside simply because a study seems promising. 
So too, participants in policy research may not be treated unjustly simply because doing so is 
necessary for the development of valuable knowledge. There may be some things that it would 
be valuable to know, for example, because such facts would greatly aid in the development of 
effective public policies, but that we may not come to know because of the moral constraints 
regarding the treatment of people. 
That said, there may be cases where the unfairness is minor enough, and the potential 
benefits of a policy RCT great enough, that the value of these potential benefits could outweigh 
the pro tanto wrongness of the unfair treatment. After all, it is sometimes on balance permissible 
to infringe people’s rights or treat people unfairly when doing so is necessary to promote a 
greater good or to satisfy people’s weightier claims to justice. That such cases are possible does 
not mean they are common. Moreover, given that the vast majority of policy RCTs enroll people 
who are disadvantaged along a number of dimensions, including political voice, it is crucial that 
requirements of fair treatment not be set aside without the most rigorous justification. 
 
